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History and Analysis

By Linus A. Hoskins

n recent years international hysteria has
erupted in regard to the astronomical
debt burden of Third World countries.
And there have been headlines suggesting
that never before have so many countries
owned so much to so few. There has also
been fear of an eventual collapse in interna
tional financial markets, followed by global
recession and economic depression.
Basically, four events triggered the debt
crisis: (i) in March 1981, Poland notified its
creditors that it could not pay $2.5 billion
out of its total foreign debt of $27 billion
that year; (ii) in August 1982, Mexico
indicated that it could not pay the interest
on its $80 billion debt; (iii) Brazil quickly
followed with the announcement that it too
was unable to pay $446 million in interest
payment on its $87 billion debt; (iv) Argen
tina fell behind on interest payments on its
$40 million debt.
This article will examine the magnitude,
causes, and cost of the Third World debt
situation. Also, the article will analyze the
reaction by some Third World countries to
the debt situation, and the different plans
that have been put forward to deal with this
intractable problem. In the conclusion,
solutions to the debt problem will be put
forward.
The plans to be analyzed are the Baker
Plan (named after U.S. Treasury Secretary
James A. Baker III); the Bradley Plan
(named after Sen. Bill Bradley, D-NJ.); the
La Falce Plan (named after Rep. John J. La
Falce, D-N.Y.); and the Schumer Plan
(named after Rep. Charles Schumer, DN.Y.).

I

Magnitude of Third World Debt

If one were to take a cursory look at the
total external debt of Third World coun
tries, one would find that the figure has now
reached an estimated peak of US $1,080
trillion. In general, according to the World
Bank, the total outstanding external debt of
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109 Third World countries has jumped from
$650 billion in 1980 to more than a trillion
in 1987.
The 1980-87 figures prove that there has
been a phenomenal increase of 67 percent
in Third World foreign debt over those
years. In more specific terms, Latin Amer
ica’s foreign debt now stands at $400 billion.
The figure for Africa is $170 billion; for the
members of CARICOM (Caribbean Com
mon Market), $7.5 billion.
On individual country basis, Brazil owes
$108 billion, Mexico $106 billion, Argentina
$52 billion, Nigeria $23 billion, Chile $20
billion, Peru $15 billion, Zambia $4.5 bil
lion, Jamaica $4.3 billion, Barbados $500
million, Trinidad and Tobago $3 billion,
Guyana $1 billion, Tanzania $3.6 billion,
and Zimbabwe $2.1 billion. (See table for
Third World debt indicators, 1980-1986.)

to shoulder the foreign debt burden. In
order to fill this financial and development
vacuum, these countries have to borrow—a
vicious circle of the debt trap of depend
ency, underdevelopment and Balkanization.
How then can Third World countries ever
generate or achieve self-sustained growth?
The salient fact is, in the Third World,
the debt crisis has diverted attention from
the real problem — a development crisis.
Let us analyze the debt indicators table: In
1980, there was a 20 percent ratio between
GNP and foreign debt; by 1986, the figure
escalated to 35 percent. This high ratio
proves the point made earlier in terms of
the gains from domestic productivity
(GNP) benefiting foreign interests, i.e.,
foreign commercial banks and financial
institutions such as the International Mon
etary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank. Over

Third World Debt Indicators (in percent)
Indicator

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

Ratio of debt to GNP
Ratio of debt to exports
Debt service ratio
Ratio of debt service
to GNP
Ratio of interest service
to exports

20.6
90.0
16.0

22.4
98.0
17.5

26.3
117.6
20.6

31.4
134.8
19.4

33.0
121.2
19.5

35.8
143.7
21.4

35.4
144.5
22.3

3.7

4.0

4.6

4.5

4.9

5.3

5.5

6.9

8.3

10.4

10.1

10.3

10.8

10.7

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1987. p. 18.
At first glance, what is striking in the
table is that when compared to a previous
year, only in six instances do the indicators
actually decline. But more importantly, the
table shows how much of their development
effort/output Third World countries have to
sacrifice in order to pay a huge foreign debt.
In other words, any productivity that takes
place does not benefit the people nor the
country but foreign interests. The bulk of
any foreign earnings/exchange that is gen
erated from exports have to be siphoned off

the 1980-86 period, there was a 29.2
percent average ratio of debt to GNP. In
fact, Third World countries are paying back
about $27 billion annually to commercial
banks in the West, while getting about $18
billion from the IMF and the World Bank.
This means then that there is a net outflow
of $9 billion of capital from poor under
developed countries to rich, industrialized
countries.
The debt indicator for exports seems too
ghastly to contemplate. In this category, the
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1988
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ratio was 90 percent in 1980, but escalated
to 144.5 percent in 1986. With this skewed
relationship and increasing protectionism in
the industrialized countries, export promo
tion is a misnomer. The 7-year average for
this indicator is a whopping 121.4 percent.
In the debt service ratio category (the
sum of payments a country makes on its
external debt divided by the exports of
goods and services), the percentage fluctu
ates but still was an astonishing 22.3
percent in 1986. The higher the debt
service ratio, the greater the debt burden
and the more dependent and under
developed a country becomes. This ratio
shows how mercilessly Third World coun
tries are being dragged through the eco
nomic wringer.
While Third World total external foreign
debt increased by 67 percent over the 7year period, their debt service ratio has
increased by about 60 percent. The average
for this indicator was 19.5 percent. And
when one looks at the ratio of debt service
to GNP indicator, there are comparable
deleterious trends. The two ratios increase
or decrease simultaneously over the years.
The debt serivce to GNP ratio almost
doubles over the period with a 4.6 percent
average. The last debt indicator, ratio of
interest service to exports is frightening. It
shows what percentage of export earnings
Third World countries have to allocate to
defray interest payments on foreign debt.
Indeed, this indicator suggests that for the
past five years, one-tenth of the export
earnings of Third World countries went
solely toward paying interest on foreign
debt. The average for this indicator stands
at 9.6 percent, almost doubling over the
period. Although World Bank net new long
term loans to Third World countries de
clined from $75 billion in 1981 to $30 billion
in 1985, the interest paid on these loans
increased from $40 billion in 1981 to $50
billion in 1985.
In Latin America, $400 billion foreigndebt represents 60.5 percent of the value of
exports of the six major countries. Out of
every dollar earned from exports, individ
ual countries must pay up to 40 cents for
debt service. If this situation persists, it will
inevitably lead to social and political destabilization in the region.
In 1983, for example, the region’s foreign
debt stood at $336 billion; this represented
four and a half times the amount in 1975 and
56 percent of the region’s GNP. The interest
payment on that debt was 38 percent of all
foreign exchange receipts from exports in

1982-83, compared with 13 percent in 1975
and 16.5 percent in 1978. On a country-by
country basis, it has been estimated that in
1985 Brazil’s interest payments as a per
centage of its export earnings was 44
percent; the figure for Mexico was 37
percent; for Chile 47 percent; for Bolivia 60
percent and for Argentina 55 percent.
The net outflow of money from Latin
America in the past five years has averaged
$25 billion annually, not counting capital
flight. In other words, money is leaving
Latin America for the industrialized world

The net outflow of money
from Latin America in the
past five years has aver
aged $25 billion annually,
not counting capital flight.

at a very crucial time when it is needed for
development. This outflow and the drop in
living standards have led many economists
to describe the region’s economic situation
as the worst since the 1930s. Even the
president of the Inter-American Develop
ment Bank (IDB), Antonio Ortiz-Mena,
was compelled to warn that “some Third
World countries will default on their debts if
(Western) commercial banks keep taking
back more money in repayments than they
put out in new loans.” 1
In the case of Africa, the annual cost of
servicing $170 billion foreign debt is about
$12 billion — enough to eat up one-half of
the continent’s total export earnings. The
total foreign debt of Africa, south of the
Sahara, was more than $57 billion at the
end of 1984; and the annual debt service
was $5.9 billion in 1982-1984. The figure
for 1985-87 has been estimated to be $10.7
billion.
In Africa, debt service payments con
sume about 50 percent of the export
earnings in several sub-Saharan countries.
For example, Sudan, Mozambique and
Madagascar owe more in loan payments to
foreign creditors than what they can obtain
from exports each year. Nigeria, on the
other hand, has to allocate 36 percent of its
exports earnings as interest payments on
its $23 billion foreign debt. In the case of
Zambia, with an estimated $650 million

export earnings in 1987, the country was
expected to pay debts of about $400 million
to the IMF, about $71 million to the World
Bank, and nearly all of the balance to
Western interests. This again is another
development Catch 22. The country then
has no other recourse but to borrow money
for development projects, despite the fact it
has used up its finite factor endowments to
produce a huge volume of exports. This
productivity has not benefited the country;
in fact, the country is worse off. In 1984,
Zambia’s per capita GNP was $470 but its
per capita debt was $429.
Africa’s foreign debt grew at an average
annual rate of 20.8 percent from 1971 to
1982, while the number of African coun
tries recording negative growth rates
reached 27 (out of 50) between 1974 and
1982.
According to the U.N. Economic Com
mission for Africa, the combination of
falling commodity prices and rising debt
payments bled Africa of about $30 billion
during 1985-86.2 In fact, commodity prices
are one-quarter to one-third what they
were in the 1970s when African countries
borrowed heavily to finance development
projects. Under these circumstances, it
seems impossible for any African govern
ment to undertake new investments and
development projects for growth and to
import vital resources needed to maintain
current export levels. Or as the U.N.
Commission’s executive director, Adebayo
Adedeji, surmises:
“Africa, poor as it is, continues to be a net
exporter of resources, paying more in debt
service than the combined total of what it
receives in foreign aid and earns from
commodity exports. . . .” 3
Causes of Third World Debt

The Third World “debt crisis is coming
more and more to be a trade crisis. The link
between trade and debt is crucial.”4 For
eign debt and trade are closely linked
because Third World countries cannot build
up foreign exchange reserves and pay off
their huge debts if protectionism in the rich
industrialized countries prevents them
from exporting their products. This loss of
export earnings is one reason many of these
Third World countries have been unable to
continue normal payments on their foreign
debt and have been forced to seek loan
extensions from private commercial banks
in the West and emergency aid from the
IMF. Compounding this situation is the fact
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that the bulk of the money Third World
countries earn from exports flows out to
pay debt interest, thus blocking their ability
to use trade surpluses to stimulate selfsustained economic growth.
According to the IDB, Latin America’s
“huge foreign indebtedness is the result of
the combined effects of a wide range of
circumstances that are endogenous to their
economies, relative to their current struc
ture, operations and policies; and of the
effect of adverse changes in the world
economy on the region’s foreign trade and
financial relations.”5 In a study, “The Exter
nal Debt of Latin America,” the IDB
outlines the specific internal and external
causes of the region’s foreign debt as
follows:
" . . . Domestically, a major portion of the
imbalance can be attributed to the policy of
expanding final demand in investment, to
the lack of appropriate incentives to sav
ings, to deficiencies in the management of
exchange policies and to the absence of a
stringent policy on the acquisition of for
eign debt. External causes include a four
fold increase in oil prices in 1973; the
deterioration in many oil importing coun
tries’ terms of trade; the 1974-1975 world
wide economic recession and the slow and
partial recovery later; protectionist trends
in the industrialized countries after 1979;
the second rise in oil prices; and the
worldwide economic recession which began
in 1980.
“These developments werefollowed by (a)
the record rise in nominal and real interest
rates in the main financial markets; (b) the
readjustment in the industrialized coun
tries; and (c) the imbalances between the
foreign exchange rates of major currencies.
Thus the decline in activity and world
trade was concerted into the most severe
general crisis since the thirties.. . . ” 6
And in an analysis of the debt crisis in
Africa, development economist Robert S.
Browne suggests the following causes for
Africa’s debt crisis:
" . . . Two prolonged periods of drought, a
sevenfold increase in the price of oil,
recession and inflation in the indus
trialized countries resulting in weakened
demand for African products, persistent
deterioration in the terms of trade, u n 
precedentedly high interest rates, and a
severely overvalued dollar have all helped to
place Africa in an economic squeeze which
has drastically altered the continent’s devel
opmental prospects and indeed threaten the
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orderly survival of several nations as thriv
ing and coherent political entities. These
externally originating catastrophes have
been exacerbated by various internal fac
tors such as localized wars, inefficient
management, and inappropriate economic
policies, including some which have dam
aged productivity in the all important
agricultural sector without producing
compensating output in other productive
sectors.
“Many governments, when confronted
with this series of shocks to their economies,

Third World countries are
caught in a vicious circle
because they have to de
vote so much of their rev
enues and export earnings
to debt servicing.
attempted but were unable to reduce ex
penditures as swiftly as revenues were
falling and to cut back on imports in
parallel with the shrinkage of their export
earnings. Instead they resorted to deficit
financing both in their domestic budgets
and in their balance of payments, which
merely fueled the inflation which had al
ready been created by the rising cost of
imports. Strenuous efforts were of course
made to cut imports, but since imports
constitute a significant input into many of
Africa’s exports, the cutback in imports
soon resulted in serious declines in produc
tion for export, thus furthering a selfreenforcing downward spiral. .. .” 7
Cost of Third World Debt

The cost of this mammoth debt on Third
World countries is unconscionable. A sub
stantial part of their national revenues must
be set aside to repay debts at a time when
commodity prices have sharply declined.
Since 1980, revenues in Africa and Latin
America have declined by 10 to 15 percent,
and there has been a deterioration in the
nutritional health of children in many coun
tries. Third World governments wanting to
reschedule their debts have been forced to
accept stiff measures or “adjustment pol
icies” imposed upon them by the IMF.
Under the IMF “stabilization program,”

Third World countries have to agree to:
■ abolish or liberalize foreign exchange and
import controls;
■ devalue currency;
■ implement anti-inflationary programs, in
cluding (a) control of bank credit, higher
interest rates and higher reserve require
ments, (b) control of government deficit,
curbs in spending, increase in taxes and in
the prices charged by public enterprises,
and abolish consumer subsidies;
■ provide greater hospitality to foreign
investment.
Emphasis is placed on enhancing the
profit capability of the domestic private
sector and foreign investors. Where the
majority of the citizens are concerned,
however, a cap is placed on the consumption
of the essentials of life (food, shelter, health,
education, and transportation) so as to free
or divert more funds to the domestic
business sector. The IMF has argued that
“. . . only if large corporations invest and
begin exporting from a country, will the
country get out of the debt.” Such
conditionality measures in the IMF “rescue
kit,” although punitive on the broad masses
of the people, do coincide with the interests
of banks in the West whose financial assets
are tied up in these countries. Some case
studies have shown that these condition
ality measures, in certain instances, have
been imposed to destabilize governments
whose domestic and foreign policies have
been designated as “anti-American,” or
Marxist-Leninist, leftist and Communist.8
Third World governments that have felt the
weight of these measures include Grenada,
under Maurice Bishop; Nicaragua, under
the Sandanistas; Cuba, under Fidel Castro;
Zambia, under Kenneth Kaunda; Tanzania,
under Julius K. Nyerere; Jamaica, under
Michael Manley and Chile, under Salvador
Allende.
In 1983, for example, 11 of the 20 largest
Third World countries were under IMF
conditionality measures. This number has
increased significantly since. Some Third
World leaders have vociferously protested
against these measures. For example, Pres
ident Kaunda of Zambia has described the
IMF debt repayment conditions as grossly
“intolerable.” Former Tanzanian President
Julius Nyerere has blasted the IMF as “an
instrument of the capitalist pow ers.. .bent
on suppressing the weak developing coun
tries by taking advantage of their poverty.”9
President Jose Sarney of Brazil has ada
mantly contended that the IMF program
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1988
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was “a recipe for recession and an inter
ference in Brazilian domestic policies” 10
and vowed, in January 1987, not to sign an
economic performance agreement with the
IMF because he feared obvious domestic
hardships and repercussions.
In the case of Jamaica, under Manley,
government negotiators with the IMF be
tween 1977 and 1979 have publicly de
scribed the IMF measures as “punitive,”
“murderous” and “a prescription for the
downfall of the government.” 11 Manley’s
government fell in 1980. In two other cases
(Sudan and the Dominican Republic), the
IMF programs resulted in riots and severe
economic hardship. Even the managing
director of the IMF has been forced to
confess that “too often. . . it is the poorest
segments of the population that have car
ried the heaviest burden of economic ad
justment.” 12
On top of these stiff IMF measures came
the collapse in commodity prices, a steep
fall in oil prices and a decline in economic
performance for Third World countries.
These global shocks not only vastly reduced
export earnings but also made it more
difficult or impossible for Third World
nations to pay off their debts on time. For
example, between 1981 and 1986 the
commodity export earnings of developing
countries, measured against the average for
1979-80, declined by $8 billion per year on
average despite expanded export volumes.
The cumulative losses in their net barter
terms of trade and export purchasing
power amounted to $93 billion and $13
billion, respectively.
Additionally, the real gross domestic
produce (GDP) fell to 4.2 percent in 1986—
from 4.8 percent in 1985 and 5.1 percent in
1984. Also, trade slowed considerably in
1986 as export earnings fell sharply and
imports declined slightly. The 3.3 percent
fall in the U.S. dollar value of exports — to
$479.8 billion—marked the second straight
year of sharp decline while the 0.1 percent
fall in imports — to $501.5 billion — sus
tained a long downward trend that left
nominal import values at 9.4 percent below
the 1982 level. The net result has been a
worsening situation in the combined trade
deficit of developing countries in 1986 —to
$21.7 billion. This is more than three times
the deficit of 1985 and also is in sharp
contrast to the $5.7 billion surplus earned
in 1984.13 The world economic situation
has reached such a precarious state with
specific devastation for Third World coun
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1988
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tries that the president of the World Bank,
Barber Conable, publicly stated:

erupted in some Latin American countries.
As one columnist noted:

" . . . Stuttering growth, volatile curren
cies, high real interest rates, heavy debt
loads, depressed commodity prices, rising
trade barriers and outside (international)
payments imbalances have acted in de
structive combination not just to slow
earlier rates of advance, but actually to
erode many previous gains by developing
societies... .”u

" . . . In many cases, the countries have
taken food from the mouths of their citizens
in order to sell it abroad. . . (to pay off their
debt)... ,”16

And in its 1986 edition of the World

Four different plans have
been put forward to solve
the Third World debt
problem.

In some countries, central government
investment has dropped by more than 80
percent in real terms between 1980 and
1985, and the government’s efforts to
service the foreign debt has aggravated
problems that had improved during the
1970s.
Third World countries are caught in a
vicious circle because they have to devote
so much of their revenues and export
earnings to debt servicing. Their ability to
invest is severely undercut, along with the
possibility for economic growth.

Reaction of the Third World

Economic Survey, the U.N. Department of
International Economic and Social Affairs
noted:
" . . . The large imbalances in trade and
payments that have in recent years charac
terized the world economy persisted in 1985
and early 1986. In particular, unprece
dented disequilibrium prevailed in the
trade and financial relations of major
industrial countries, and there was a
continued overall net transfer of resources
from developing to developed countries,
largely related to the international debt
crisis. Both o f these situations were, in the
course of 1985, increasingly perceived as
unsustainable, economically as well as
politically... .”15
While the economic costs of the debt
burden have been devastating, the social/
human costs have also been of similar
magnitude. The main human cost is that the
struggle to pay interest on the foreign debt
has siphoned off resources from social
programs that benefit the poor majority.
Unemployment has spiralled; poverty esca
lated; basic human needs/services not de
livered; standards of living have dropped;
consumer prices (inflation) have shot up
(e.g. Bolivia 8,216 percent, Argentina 850
percent, Brazil 234 percent, Mexico 66.5
percent and Jamaica 27.8 percent — as of
April 1985). Worst of all, civil violence has

Just as some Third World countries have
vociferously protested against the IMF
conditionality measures, they have reacted
likewise to their foreign debt situation. On a
collective basis, in January 1984, 26 Latin
American and Caribbean countries con
vened in Quito, Ecuador, to deal with the
region’s $400 billion external debt problem.
They unanimously adopted the Declaration
of Quito and Plan of Action. They asserted:
" . . . Responsibility for the external debt
problem must be shared by the debtor and
the developed countries, the international
private banking system and the m ulti
lateral finance organizations.. . .”17
" . . . The Latin American and Caribbean
countries have already assumed their re
sponsibility by making extraordinary ad
justments in their economies and enor
mous efforts to meet their international
obligations, despite the high social, political
and economic cost involved.. . .”18
They further agreed:
" . . . Because of these circumstances and
the need to maintain adequate levels of
development in Latin America and the
Caribbean and to avoid greater crises in
the international economic and financial
system, it is to the mutual benefit of those
concerned that an urgent solution befound
to the problem of the region’s external
d e b t....”19
In May 1984, the governments of four of
the most heavily indebted Latin American

5
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countries met in Mexico to discuss a
proposal to extend debt repayments over a
15-year period. The proposal, which was
circulated in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
and Mexico, sought to repay debts over a
period of nine years after a six-year grace
period. Brazil wanted the period to extend
to 10 years with a five-year grace period.
The proposal also sought the following:
(i) a repayment schedule similar to a
graduated mortgage, with smaller pay
ments at the outset that would gradually
increase and interest rates fixed for each
country according to the circumstances
surrounding each one and its possibility of
economic recovery, (ii) debt payments
based on the export incomes of the individ
ual countries and set so the payments
should not absorb more than is compatible
with the maintenance of adequate levels of
internal productive activity.
The four governments argued that the
rationale behind their proposal was that
with current levels of external debt and
declining economic activity, Latin Amer
ican governments are being forced to
choose between debt or democracy and
that current repayment plans have turned
the region into a net exporter of capital.20
In June 1984, ministers of 11 Latin
American countries met in Cartagena,
Colombia, to consider a variety of joint
initiatives to ease the foreign debt burden.
Among the initiatives discussed were: (i)
the establishment of a formal system for
proposing reforms in both loan payment
terms and the international financial sys
tem, (ii) compensation from the indus
trialized countries whose policies restrict
trade or increase the burden of interest
payments, and ways to place limits on
interest rates or annual debt payments, (iii)
the drawing up of new guidelines for the
terms of loan payments and to press for
financial reform on the industrialized coun
tries21 (a proposal the Reagan administra
tion has strongly opposed.)
In February 1985, the economic and
foreign ministers of the 11 most heavily
indebted Latin American countries called
for a dialogue between governments of
lending and borrowing countries on the
issue of external debt within what they
called a “political” and “economic” frame
work. Meeting in Santo Domingo, Domin
ican Republic, February 7-8, the ministers
reiterated their earlier proposals for resolv
ing the debt problem and announced their
intention to press for more liberal re
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scheduling terms for all of the region’s
debtor countries.
In their final communique, the Car
tagena Group called for lower interest rates
on loan payments. The ministers also noted
that because of the high debt burden and
high interest rates, the region was sending
abroad far more dollars to foreign interests
than it was receiving annually, thus hinder
ing development and growth.22
Toward the end of 1985, the Cartagena
Group hinted at a confrontation with the
multilateral and commercial banks and in-

Developing countries
cannot achieve economic
growth while continuing to
transfer liquid capital
resources abroad.

dustrialized nations when the economic and
foreign ministers of the 11 most heavily
indebted Latin American nations issued a
set of “emergency” proposals for negotia
tions on debt and growth, aimed at gaining
concessions from international creditors.
Meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay, De
cember 16-17, the ministers stated in a joint
declaration that living standards in Latin
America have slipped back by a decade
between 1980 and 1985, due to the decline
in international economic conditions. They
argued for a series of emergency measures
to counteract the effects of high interest
rates and adverse terms of trade, and to
finance levels of investment strong enough
to support a projected doubling of the
region’s output.
In March 1986, a ministerial-level com
mittee of the Cartagena Group met in
Punta del Este, Uruguay, as a follow-up to
their December 1985 meeting. During this
emergency session, the representatives of
the major debtor nations —Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, Venezula and Colombia—stated
that there must be “significant changes in
existing loan agreements, especially with
regard to interest rates” and that “certain
countries have reached the point where
such changes, which would apportion the
adjustment burden more evenly between
lenders and borrowers, could no longer be
delayed.”23

The ministers concluded that if lower
interest rates cannot be obtained by debtor
countries through negotiations with banks,
then unilateral action on the part of the
debtors is justified and the 11 members of
the Cartagena Group would unanimously
support such action. The ministerial-level
committee did not propose unilateral action
as a desirable course of action, but only as a
last resort if negotiations with the indus
trialized countries failed to reduce debt
burdens sufficiently. The committee also
did not discuss the question of repudiation
of all or part of their external debt,24 as has
been proposed by Cuba’s Fidel Castro.
In addition, economic and finance minis
ters of the intergovernmental Group of 24
on International Monetary Affairs, meeting
in Buenos Aires, Argentina, March 1986,
voiced concern that prevailing debt strat
egies had failed thus far to produce encour
aging results and stressed that the debt
servicing ratio of developing countries
would improve only if credit flows were
maintained and new initiatives taken.
Also, the ministers called for an interna
tional conference to discuss both the debt
crisis and the transfer of vital resources to
developing countries within the context of
reform of the international monetary sys
tem. As the president of Argentina, Raul
Alfonsin, observed at the meeting:
" . . . the debt crisis does not result pri
marily from the domestic policies of debtor
countries but from the impact of discrimi
natory and inflationary policies pursued by
a majority of industrial countries on the
balance of payments position of developing
countries. .. .” 25
And after a consultative meeting in
Washington, D.C., April 1986, the inter
governmental Group of 24 issued a final
communique in which they reiterated that
the failure of the current debt management
approach to find a definitive solution to the
debt crisis is deeply rooted in an inadequate
diagnosis of the problem and, as a con
sequence, there are inconsistencies be
tween short-term deflationary adjustment
policies and the need to obtain a long-term
equilibrium.
On an individual country basis, in June
1985, Peru’s President Alan Garcia em
barked on a plan of “national resistance” in
which he declared that his country would
use no more than 10 percent of its export
earnings to service its $13.5 billion foreign
debt. In July 1986, he announced that this
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1988
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policy would continue for another year and
that his government will limit foreign debt
payments by private Peruvian companies
and will also prohibit foreign investors from
repatriating profits for two years.
In July 1986, Brazil’s finance minister,
Dilson Funaro, told creditors that his coun
try intends to limit its annual payments on
its debt to only 2.5 percent of its GNP. The
minister argued that Brazil could not
achieve the annual 7 percent growth rate of
its economy toward which the government
was striving if it has to pay foreign creditors
4 percent of its GNP. In February 1987,
President Jose Sarney went further. He
announced that Brazil would suspend inter
est payments on its $68 billion in foreign
commercial debt, about 23 percent of which
is owed to U.S. banks. Brazil has to pay
about $800 million in interest payments
every month on its staggering $108 billion
foreign debt.
In July 1987, Brazil broadened its mor
atorium on foreign debt by announcing that
it had suspended $1 billion in principal
payments to the Paris Club, a group of
Western creditor nations. The government
stated that its action was not meant as an
act of aggression against foreign creditors
but as a means of defending its dwindling
hard-currency reserves.
Further, in June 1987, Brazil asked the
IMF to delay payments on its debt. The
IMF has never before granted such ap
proval. And no member of the IMF has ever
reneged on loan payments. In fact, debtor
governments regard payments of interest
and principal owed to the IMF as sacro
sanct. Brazil has been paying the IMF
about $1.1 million a year in interest and
principal. It has yet to unilaterally suspend
its payments to the IMF. Brazil’s total
external debt is $108 billion plus interest,
$4.75 billion of which is owed to the IMF.26
Bolivia, in 1983, stopped making pay
ments on its debt of $3.3 billion to commer
cial banks; many banks had already written
off the debt as unpayable. Also, in May
1984, this “cash-starved” country an
nounced that it was limiting repayments to
international lending agencies (IMF and
World Bank) to only 25 percent of the
country's export earnings.
In August 1985, Bolivia’s President Vic
tor Paz Estenssoro resolved to renegotiate
the country’s external debt with its cred
itors “without taking bread from the
mouths of the people.”27
Ecuador, in February 1987, refused to
make the required interest payment to its
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bank lenders. The government stated that
“cash flow” difficulties, precipitated by
deteriorating oil prices, prevented it from
making the payment. And in March the
government cancelled all foreign debt pay
ments for the rest of the year and appealed
for international aid because of a series of
earthquakes that destroyed villages and
crippled the country’s oil industry. Loss of
revenues caused by the quakes forced the
government to discontinue making pay
ments on its $9.1 billion foreign debt.
In Mexico, President Miguel de la
Madrid declared, in February 1986, that
foreign creditors must “share the respon
sibility” for his country’s $106 billion for
eign debt crisis and must, as a result, accept
a reduction in interest payments. He ex
plained that the chaotic oil market situation
has deprived Mexico of $6 billion in antici
pated income, reducing federal income by
12.5 percent and the country’s total export
earnings by almost a third. Mexico depends
for two-thirds of its hard-currency earnings
on oil exports. In his televised speech,
President de la Madrid stated that Mexico’s
debt-servicing load must be lightened “in
accord with the country’s ability to pay” and
that “requires sacrifice on the part of the
international creditors.”
Also, he announced that Mexico will be
sending proposals for new debt negotia
tions to foreign creditors because the coun
try wished to retain “the respect of the
international community” and hoped to
resolve the debt problem “through negotia
tion, not confrontation.”28
Mexico’s proposals included: elimination
of additional new borrowing, conversion of
interest calculations from the US base rate
to Libor (London inter-bank overseas rate),
linkage of interest payments to the world
price for oil, and deferral of payments of
principal and interest on its old debt.
Mexico also proposed to pay half of its
foreign debt over 15-25 years.
A high ranking Mexican negotiator has
stated that the reaction of the foreign
creditors to the proposals was cool; they
feared that countenancing Mexico’s de
mand would pave the way for similar
demands by Latin America’s other debt
ors.29
Cuba’s Castro, in April 1986, told foreign
creditors that Cuba will suspend debt
payments for 90 days starting in May while
seeking more favorable repayment terms
and $500 million in cash to make up for a
projected revenue shortfall. Cuba owes
$3.5 billion to creditors in the West. More

over, in recent months, President Castro
has been vigorously urging Third World
nations to repudiate the foreign debts they
owe to banks and governments. Castro’s
argument is that Latin America’s heavy
debt burden stymies the creation of new
jobs for the more than 100 million unem
ployed workers in the region and inhibits
financially strapped governments from pro
viding basic human needs to their citizens.
And in July 1987, the Philippines govern
ment announced that it would limit pay
ment on its foreign debt to 10 percent of its
merchandise trade and commodity export
receipts. The government acted because
payments on its $28 billion foreign debt
consumes more than 45 percent of its
merchandise export receipts, and accounts
for 40 percent of all government expendi
tures.
In Africa, in January 1986, Nigerian
leader Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida de
clared that his country would use no more
than 30 percent of its export earnings to
pay its $23 billion foreign debt. In effect, he
told foreign creditors that year either to
settle for a little more than half of what they
are owed or risk getting nothing. Nigeria’s
decision, like Mexico’s, is based on the
sharp drop in oil prices; Nigeria depends on
oil for about 94 percent of its export
earnings.
Finally, in July 1987, Zambia decided to
allocate only 10 percent of its export
earnings to pay its foreign debt.
Plans to Solve Third World Debt

Four different plans have been put forward
to solve the Third World debt problem. The
first is the Baker Plan, put forward by the
Reagan administration. This plan was un
veiled in October 1985 by Treasury Secre
tary James A. Baker III during a speech at
the World Bank-IMF annual meeting in
Seoul. Its essential elements include: (i)
adoption by debtor countries of compre
hensive macroeconomic and structural pol
icies to promote growth, balance of pay
ments adjustment and lower inflation, (ii)
increased lending by the World Bank and
other multilateral development banks,
amounting to an additional $9 billion in net
lending during 1986-88 as well as more
effective structural adjustment lending by
these institutions in conjunction with a
continued central role for the IMF, (iii) an
increase in net new lending by private
commercial banks over the next three years
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to support comprehensive economic adjust
ment programs.
The Baker Plan also identified 15 in
debted countries that would require net
new lending from commercial banks in the
range of $20 billion over the next three
years. The plan stresses that countries now
receiving adequate financing from banks on
a voluntary basis should continue to do so
provided they maintain sound economic
policies.
In April 1987, Secretary Baker modified
his plan because he felt that the proposed
amount of new bank lending in his original
plan was “clearly disappointing” in 1986,
and that new and creative ways are needed
to keep the flow of commercial money
moving to the Third Word. The modified
plan proposed that banks develop “a menu
of alternative new money options” to avoid
“periodic financial crises.” Baker rejected
any “debt relief” or “debt forgiveness” for
debtor Third World countries.
The Baker Plan had to be modified
because there was widespread concern that
it merely added to the existing debt burden
of the developing countries, who actually
need relief from the cost of servicing their
foreign debt instead of new loans. In addi
tion, the commercial banks only lent lip
service to the original plan; they were not as
forthcoming in lending new money to the
heavily indebted Third World countries.
The second is the Bradley Plan, which
was unveiled in Zurich in late June 1986.
Senator Bill Bradley contends that debt
management has stalled development in
Third World countries, hurt U.S. industry
and trade, lost the U.S. 1.4 million jobs and
destroyed jobs elsewhere in the indus
trialized world. He also links the debt
problem with the potential for failure of the
democratic process in Latin America.
The main elements of the Bradley Plan
are: (i) development banks (as in the Baker
Plan) would boost their lending by $3 billion
a year over a three-year period, but in
contrast to the Baker Plan there would be
no new loans required from commercial
banks, (ii) an annual trade/debt summit
would be called and chaired by the president
of the World Bank (using this forum, debtor
nations who agree to economic reforms
would get 3 percentage points of interest
rate relief for a three-year period on all
outstanding commercial and other bilateral
loans, plus a 3 percent write-down of
principal a year over a three-year period),
(iii) to qualify for trade relief packages,
debtors would make internally generated
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(not dictated from the outside) policy
changes to generate growth, liberalize
trade and capital flow, reverse capital flight,
and keep debt management free from
scandal.
The third is the La Falce Plan, a debt
proposal in a March 1987 congressional bill
“to promote a stable international financial
system, expand world trade, and alleviate
the Third World debt crisis.” The centerpiece of Rep. John L. La Falce’s legislation is
a debt adjustment facility which would be
specifically authorized to assist creditor
banks in the voluntary disposition of loans
to heavily indebted borrowers. Also, the La
Falce plan would be empowered to encour
age countries with strong capital surpluses
to apply these surpluses to investments in
heavily indebted countries, purchase bank
loans at a discount, and establish mecha
nisms for passing along the benefit of any
such discount to the debtor country. In
essence, this would enable commercial
banks to voluntarily dispose of loans they no
longer wish to hold at a discount and to
rebate most of that discount to the debtor
country in the form of lower principal.
According to Rep. La Falce, his proposal
for a new debt adjustment facility is based
on the premise that the burden of existing
debt must be reduced before “new private
capital flows will or should take place.” This,
in my view, makes sense. Not reducing the
current debt burden before new lending
money is received would be tantamount to a
debt surtax on debtor Third World coun
tries.30 This brings up the important ques
tion of debt relief or cancellation recom
mended in the Bradley Plan, but rejected in
Baker Plan. World Bank President Barber
Conable (a former Republican congressman
from New York) has also rejected any form
of generalized debt relief for developing
nations and stresses that the Baker Plan
should be the guiding principle in attempt
ing to cope with the $1 trillion Third World
debt problem.31
The fourth is the Schumer Plan, which
calls for outright debt forgiveness or relief.
The main elements of Rep. Charles
Schumer’s Plan are: (i) traditional new
loans, (ii) interest rate relief, (iii) forgiveness
of some debt principal and (iv) debt-equity
swaps.
In analyzing the four plans, it should be
obvious that the Baker Plan would not work
because its centerpiece rests on commer
cial banks making more credit available to
heavily indebted countries.
The answer to the debt problem is NOT
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more money but relief/reduction in the debt
burden/cost. Only European and U.S. banks
stand to benefit from the Baker Plan; there
is no impact on the productive forces in the
recipient Third World countries.
In short, the Baker Plan is geared toward
deepening the dependent-underdevelop
ment and Balkanization of the heavily
indebted Third World countries. Further, it
suggests that the “new money” is condi
tioned on a program of growth-oriented
adjustment being in place and approved by
the IMF. And the commercial banks will
lend only in conjunction with concerted new
lending by the World Bank, the Interna
tional Monetary Fund and the Inter-Amer
ican Development Bank. By putting these
institutions in charge of the implementation
of the Baker Plan, the administration is
skillfully securing U.S. control over the
economic and political policies of debtor
nations.
Simply put, the Baker Plan is akin to a
credit card customer who owes, for exam
ple, $700 and then borrows $700 from a
commercial bank to pay the creditors off.
After the creditors are paid off, the cus
tomer still owes $700 in principal plus
interest to the new lender. The customer
then has to work hard or overtime to pay the
additional costs of the new loan. In the long
run, therefore, the customer is worse off.
On the other hand, the Bradley Plan
suggests it is time to stop new lending
which, in reality, comes right back to the
banks as interest payments and increases in
principal. This plan calls for fundamental
changes, given the current reality that debt
is piling up too high in developing countries.
The strong points in this plan are loan
principal write-offs and interest rate reduc
tion of up to $50 billion.
Also, the Bradley Plan, unlike Baker’s,
indicates, with fewer loans to repay, Latin
America could afford more U.S. exports.
The only sensible plan, therefore, seems
to be a combination of the Bradley — La
Falce—Schumer Plans, which will focus on
the most important elements—debt relief/
cancellation and debt-equity swaps.
Solutions to Third World Debt

How can heavily indebted Third World
countries solve their debt problem? First,
they should take a lesson from the Car
tagena Group and resolve NOT to pay on
their debt until a reasonable 10-year grace
period elapses in order to give them enough
time to improve their trade and balance of
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payments positions. This is based on the
premise that only economic growth of the
debtor countries will enable them to ap
proach any solution to their debt problems.
Developing countries cannot achieve
economic growth while continuing to trans
fer liquid capital resources abroad. The only
way out of their debt crisis is to stop
borrowing.
Second, they should ask for debt re
scheduling or a moratorium, even though
these are just Band-Aid solutions.
Third, in my view, Third World countries
should force radical restructuring of the
international financial and monetary sys
tem within the context of the North-South
dialogue. Also, they MUST demand as a
collective debtor cartel that international
financial institutions and commercial banks
CANCEL debts either in whole or in part.
Fourth, they should limit only 10 percent
of their export earnings toward foreign debt
payment.
Fifth, they should demand better trade
policies and less protectionist measures on
the part of the industrialized countries.
Sixth, they should reactivate the idea of
establishing their own independent devel
opment bank — similar to the World BankIMF and IDB. This way they have control
over development loan measures, thereby
extricating themselves from the draconian
conditionality measures imposed by inter
national lending institutions.
□
Linus A. Hoskins, Ph.D., is a graduate assistant
professor, School o f Human Ecology, Howard Univer
sity.
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